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I PREFACE 
I I . ... rJ T'r 
,,;_ ~+. r .. J \J .. ) 
In studying and teaching history, 1 have 
been oonvinoed that the transportation facilities of" 
a country have helped or hindered ~ts polltlcal, 
industrial, and commerclal development. • 
In this thesis, 1 have endeavored to show 
the value of the rallroads of Kentucky during the 
political confllct known as the Clvil War • 
• 
1 have consulted a number of historical 
records and have trled to select, from them, the most 
convincing proofs. Articles consulted are listed 
in the bibliography at the close. This thesis was 
prepared in connection with a semin~r course at the 
Uhi versi ty of Loui sville, on --Ken tucky during the 
Civi.l War". 
"The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 
1861-1865", by Dr. R. S. Cotterill, discusses very 
carefully the history of the Louisville and Nsshvllle 
during the War. Therefore, 1 havp not dlscussed 
that road in this theSiS. 
Jessie Munday 
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In the decade precedlng the Civll War, the 
railroads in Kentucky, as in many of our other states, 
had begun to prove, indisputably, their value from a 
commercial viewpoint. From 1861-1865, the railroads , 
instituted to further the development of peaceful 
pursuits and progressive plans, played their parts in 
the great political conflict between the North and 
the South. In this great strq;gle, the railroads of 
Kentucky assumed a conspicuous place. 
There were .several railroads in operation, 
in Kentucky, dur",ng the Clvil War. Probably, the 
most noted of all those railroads was the LOU16Vllle 
and Nashville, whose r~cord, during the War, has 
\ 
already 'been recorded. (1) Another of these roads was 
the Louisvllle and Frankfort, connect~ng the two 
cities from whlch it acquired its name. Another road 
extended from Lexington to Frankfort and was known as 
the Lexington and Frankfort. A fourth rallroad, the 
Kentucky Central, connected Covington and Lexlngton. 
A leased branch of the last named railroad extended 
from Lexington to Nichol~sville. The Moolle and Ohio 
had been constructed from Moblle, Alabama, to 
Columbus, Kentucky, and, hence, crossed the extreme 
western corner of Kentucky. 
The early hlstory of the two railroads, 
known as the LOUlbville and Frankfort and the Lex~ng­
ton and Frankfort, dates back to the incorporation of 
the Lexington and Ohio Ra.llroad Company by an act of 
the Kentucky Leg.lslature, January 27, 1830. According 
to thlS act, the Lexington and Ohio Rallroad Company 
was given all right necessary to oonstruct a.railroad 
from Lexington to one or more points on the OhlO 
River. (2) 
By an act of the Leglslature. February 2, 
1833, the Company was given power to go through 
LOUlsvllle to the Ohio River at pOlnts which seemed 
advi sable. (3) 
One and one half miles of the road had been 
completed oy August 1, 183~. The road was formally 
opened August 14, 1032. ln the wlnter of 1835, the 
"First iron horse dashed into Frankfort with a train 
of cars at its heels, drawn all the way from Lexing-
ton. Frankfort and Lexington were now connected". (4) 
Work at the other end of the llne was not so 
satisfactory. The road from Portland to Louisville 
was finished in 1838 and a steam railway serVlce 
instltuted. However, after several years) a locomotive 
exploded and that end of the line discontinued its 
work. (5) 
The rallroad was sold, January, 1842, the 
company having oeen default. The State oecame the 
4. 
purchaser. (6) The road between Lexington and Frank-
fort was leased by an act of March 9, 1843, by the 
Board of Internal Improvements, to Philip Swigert and 
William McKee, for seven years, dating from March 13, 
1843. (7) McKee died and, by a leglslatlve act of 
February 29, 1848, the State became his substitute for 
two years. l8) 
The Louisville and Frankfort Rallroad Com-
pany was incorporated by an act of the Leglslature, 
March 1, 1047, with power to build a railroad from St. 
Clair Street, Frankfort, to one or more po.nts on the 
Ohio. Power was also given to construct branches. 
This new company purchased, February 29, 1848, the 
rights of the part of the old Lexington and Ohio Hail-
road between Frankfort and LouisVllle. (9) The road 
from Frankfort to Louisville was completed Decemoer 13 , 
1851, with the terminal at Louisville instead of Port-
l~nd. The depot was on Jefferson between Brook and 
Floy d Streets. (10) 
The part of the railroad between Lexington 
and Frankfort was purchased by the Lexington and 
Frankfort Railroad Company which was incorporated by 
an act of the Leglslature, February 28, 1848. Power 
was given, by this act, to construct the road from 
Lexing ton to one or more pOlnts on the Kentucky river 
in or near Frankfort. (11) Provislon was also made 
that the LOU1Bville and Frankfort and the Lexlng ton 
and Frankfort railroads should "be operated as a 
continuous line oetween Lexine-ton and L01 isvtllp, the 
net profits to be divjded between thp. two companies. 
(12 
Beginning .July 1, 1859, the whole line 
from Lexi~ton to Lo isville was operated as onc road 
under th~ c~ntrol of an executive committee of six 
members. ThuB the old Lexington and Ohio Railroad, 
the first built in Kentucky ~nd tho first west of tho 
Alleghany Mountains I dj s9.ppeared. In teF1.d, there 
appeared two ra·lro~ds. thA Louisvillp. and Frankfort 
and the Lexin~ton and Frankfort. Th~ last two, al-
though they were sep9.rate roads during the War. were 
operat~d as one. Th~ available renorts. in many cases, 
deal with the roads as with one system. 
A few facts pcrtaining to the early istory 
of the Kentucky Central wlll help to locate the field 
through WhlCh that roa.d opera.ted during the War. '1'ho 
history of the road may be traced to the incorporation 
of the Licking and Lexington R~ilro~d Company, oy ~ 
act of the Kentucky Legisl9.ture, Marc~ 1, 1847. 
Acco~dinr, to this act. the proposed road was to begin 
at 0 1' in Newport or Covington, to proceed throwh or 
near Falmouth, Cynthiana, and Paris to Lexington. 
Branch roads were also nermissible. (13) 
An act of the Legisl~ture changed the namR 
of the comnany to the Covlngton and Lexlnrton Railroad 
Cnmpan r in 1849. (14) Th Legislature passed an act, 
March 10, 1856, to amend tho charters of the CovinP-;ton 
A s tone sill whi ch formed a part of the 
old Lexington & Ohio track. Straps 01 iron 
were fastened along the top of such sills. 
6. 
and Lexington and LexLngton and Danville. a railroad 
WhLCh had been chartered but not constructed. so as to 
make lt posslble to have the two rallroads adopt the 
name of the Kentucky Central RaLlroad. This name, 
however, dld not effect the separate corporate name or 
responsibllities of either company. There were, ther~ 
fore, two divlsione of the Kentucky Central. The first 
division extended from Covington to Lexington and the 
second was to extend from Lexlngton to the Tennessee 
line. (15) The road from Lexlngton to the Tennessee 
line. however, had not been constructed further than 
Nlcholasville. 
The property, rlghts, and franchises of 
the company were sold, October 5, 1859. R. B. Bowler. 
as director, was real purchaser. Bowler and several 
others formed a jOlnt stock company, January 1, 1861, 
for operatlng the road. (16) 
On January 1, 1863, the tltle was vested in 
~. A. Keith and Wllliam Ernst who were to hold as 
trustees, for lnterested parties, for the uses stated 
in a deed executed to them by bowler and wife, 
January 30, 1863. (17) The assoclatlon controlled 
that part of the Kentucky Oentral, known as the First 
DiVision or Covlngton and Lexington Railroad, until 
the close of the War. 
The Covlngton and LeXington and ltS 
successor, the Kentucky Central, operated, under 
three leases, during the War, the road known as the 
Maysville and Lexi ngton Railroad. The latter had been 
incorporated by three acts of the Legislature, in the 
decade preceding the War. It was sold under fore-
closure, April 23, 1856, to a committee of bondholders 
who recognized the company, December 4, 1856 and was 
operated as. previously stated, during the period of 
the Civil War. (18) The part of the road from Paris 
to Lex~ngton, 17.69 miles, was completed before the 
outbreak of the War but the section from Paris to 
Maysv~lle was not completed until after the close of 
the War. 
ThuB the Kentucky Central, as referred to 
in th~s art~clet emoraces the COVington and Lexington 
Railroad, the leased Maysv~lle and Lex~ngton Railroad, 
and the section of railroad from Lexington to 
Nicholasvllle. 
The Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company was 
incorporated in Alabama, February 3, 1848 and complet-
ed the railroad, as far as Columbus, Kentucky, by 
April 22, 1861. 
At the opening of the War, a railroad ex-
tended from Paducah into Tennessee. The citizens of 
Paducah had voted to build a branch road from Paducah 
to the Mobil~ a.nd Ohio 'out the roa.d was not complet-
ed • 
8. 
In addition to the roads mentioned, a number 
of other roads or oranchea had been projected. Among 
the incompleted roads, was the Henderson and Nashville, 
which was not flnished until after the War. 
Kentucky. therefore, had rallroad facilitles 
at the beginning of 1861 which. necessarily, would 
play a part in the conflict between the North and the 
South. 
Chapter 1 
Louisville and Frankfort 
and 
Lexington and Fra.nkfort Ra~lroad8 
At thetJeginning of the Civil War , the 
Louisville and Frankfort, consisting of 65 miles of 
road, and the Lexing ton and Frankfort, 29 miles in 
length, constituted two very important links in the 
chain of railroads extending through Kentucky. This 
chain of railroads was made possible because Lexing-
ton wa s no t only the ter.minus of one of the roads 
just mentioned but also of the Kentucky Central which 
made northern connection through Covington while 
Louisville was a te~inus of both the Louisville and 
Frankfort and the Louisville and Nashvllle. Louis-
ville was a storage place for supplies. Although the 
railroad connection just outl l ned was rather indirect, 
in t l mes of war, all ava~lable methods of transporta-
tion are reverted to regardless of whether they mayor 
may not have been previously used as the most pract i cal 
route. Thus the Louisvi lle and Frankfort and Lexing-
ton and Frllnkfort played their part as oonneoting links 
and served the Unlon oause during the War. 
As t h e se t wo sepa ra te r oads we r e ope rated 
as one unde r a bo dy of direc t or s during the War , this 
article will consider t he two s imultaneously. 
The rolling stock of the two r oads was 
limited, consisting, a t the beginning of the War of 
5 baggage cars, 10 passe~~pr cars, L9 house f~pjght 
cars, 18 house stock ca rs, 50 open stock dars , 4l 
11. 
platform cars, 18 construction cars, 20 hand ballast 
cars, 26 hand cars, and 13 locomotives. (19) 
During .the period of Kentucky's neutrall ty 
pollcy, the LOUlsv~lle and Frankfort and the Lexing-
ton and Frankfort were effected by Kentucky's 
attltude toward the War. The states north of Ken-
tucky looked wlth suspicion at thelr southern nelgh-
oor and made efforts to prevent articles being 
shipped to Kentucky for fear that those articles wotld 
prooeed to the seceded states. Naturally, the busi -
ness of the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington 
and Frankfort was interfered with. 
~ group of Cincinnatti citizens declared 
that any person, in that city, who sold or shipped 
provisions or oontraoand articles of war to any state 
whlch had not declared its loyalty to the government, 
was a traitor. (20) Thus they tried to stop trade 
with Kentucky and the South. The governor of Ohio 
issued orders, in April 1861, that the presidents of 
rallroads in Ohlo exa,mlne freight going toward any 
seceded state and the legislature of that state 
declared lt trejson to send military provlsions to 
enemies of the United States. (21) Commlttees were 
apPolnted by the leglslature of lndlana to investi-
gate regulations necessary in regard to shipping 
grains and provlsions on the different railroads. (22) 
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An order was given oy Salmon P. Chase, May 
3, 1861, to seize railroad cars whose destination was 
a place under insurreotory control. (23) This order 
also effected the two roads. 
Some of the people of Kentuoky trled to 
stop trade. A meeting was held, in Aprll, at the 
Court House 1n LOU1SV1lle for those who were opposed 
. to shipping. A Letter from a cltizen of LOUlsvllle 
appeared in a Cinoinnatti paper, in April, asking the 
peo~le of Clncinnatti not to ship graln and provlsions 
to LOUlsville for, accordlng to the letter, those 
provlslons would go south . (24) 
Thus, during the period of neutrallty, 
there was a strong effort on the part of some to stop 
trade over the railroads leading into Kentucky and 
to Louisville, the supply station for the Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad. 
The annual reports for the two roads for 
the fiscal year, em-bracing the first part of 1861, 
showed a deorease in the earnlne s as compared with 
those of the preceding year. Yet, notwithstanding 
the efforts that were made to sto~ trade, Superintend-
ent Gill stated ) ln hlS report ) that wh~le a large 
portion of the decrease was due to the deorease 1n 
passenger rece1pts caused by the polltical cond1tions , 
yet, at the same time, there were comparatively good 
receipts from articles of produce. (25) Ho ever, it 
was necessary to reduce the wages and salaries of the 
employees of the road th~t year. 
After the period of neutral~ty c~me to an 
end, there seemed no doubt that the Loui sville and 
Frankfort and the Lexi ng ton and Frankfort railroads 
would su pport the Union Cause. EdWard D. Hobbs, the 
pres~dent of the roads from 18 55-1867 was said to be ) 
energetic, skillful in bus~ness, sound in judgment, 
and of excellent character. Samuel Gill, the super-
intendent, was a strong Union man. Both men seemed to 
co-operate with the plans of the North. 
The mil~tary campaigns embracing Kentucky, 
in 1861, involved the railroads in the southern part 
of the State rather than those in the northern 
section. In the year 1862, however, the Confederates 
showed that they realized the importance of the ra~l-
roads, in Northern Kentucky, as connecting links and 
endeavored to break the lines of communication. 
Hence the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lex~ng ton 
and Frankfort suffered. 
One of the leaders in attacks upon the 
railroads was John Morgan. On July 8, 1862, he cross-
ed the Cumberland River into Kentucky on h~s fi r st 
raid. He routed a force at Tompkinsville and, with~n 
a few days, marched through Glasgow, Lebanon, Spring-
field , Harrodsburg , Lawrenceburg, and Versailles to 
Midway. At the latter place , the telegraph operator 
14. 
was captured, desired information was received from 
Federal headquarters, and misleading messages acout 
C nfederate activitles fo warded. causinF a chan e in 
Federal pl~ns and creatin excitement in important 
cities along the railroads between Louisvllle and 
Lexington. Trools had been sent, from Harro dsburg. to 
burn the railroad bridges and prevent troops bein 
sent from Louisville and Cincinnatt1 to interfere at 
Midwa.y. 
he traln. bound for Louisv lle, which left 
Lexington on July 15. 1862, received information. the 
other side of Mldway. that the railroad tack had been 
torn up. The train returned to L xlnGton. (?6 N 
t~a'ns ran between Frankfort and Lexlngton on th 
flfteenth, s'xteenth, or seventeenth. After the rail-
road track near M' d 'a had 'been repaired. the Confed-
erates had vislted It again and had torn up a part of 
he track causin~ the delay in t ansportation. 
Not only were thpse railroads effected 
during Morgan's raid. in 1862. but again. in the fall 
of that year. they became involved in a military 
camnalgn. Du. 'ng the invasion of General Bragg and 
General Kirby Smith. the onfe erate forces showed 
their deslre to control the railroad communication 
wi th the North. 
In the latter part of the summer of 1862, 
General Kirby Smith entered Kentucky thro~h Big 
CTeek G~n. (27) H pr cp~ded t ward R' ~mond. The 
Federa19 ~dvanced to meet him. were defe~ted . and 
ratren. +.pd toward Lexin, ton. Bv Se temb Pl" ,186::> . 
11) • 
Lexington had been evacuated by th~ FederalA and 
occupied by General Smith. (?8) There Morgan jo'ned 
the Confederates on Septembe 4, 1862. Th~ Federal 
abandoned Frankfort and other important vosts, leaving 
the Louisville and Frankfort and, the Lexinrton and 
Frankfort in the hands of the Confederates. Wi h'n 
a sho time, Gene-cal Kirby Smith joined General 
Bragg at Frankfort. G neral Don Carlos Huell entered 
Ll')uisv i lIe in th l::\tter part of September. A.t the 
end of that month the Con~ederates held Frankfort and 
/ 
Lexington. During the month of Spntember and a part 
of Octooer, therefore, the Louisville and Frankfort 
and the Lexington and Fra.nkfort, for hearly the entire 
length, were in the hands of the Confeder~tes •. Thp 
rebels, at one time, ran a passenger train between 
Lexington and Frankfort with the locomotiv 
Jefferson. (29) 
After the batt ~ of Perryville, Bragg 
retre~ted from Ke~tucky and the roads passed out of 
Confedera e hands. 
During the occupancy of the roadsoy the 
COlfederate troops "all the bridges (save the one 
over Elkhornt one water-station, several hand cars, 
and three or four sets of telegraph instruments were 
16. 
d~stroyed by them". (10) The cost of repairing the 
roads was about $26.500. (31) While the roads were 
in the han ds of the Con ederateR, naturally all bus-
iness ceased . materlal loss was caused, and the Dads 
were not ao1e to carryon their part in th e g eat 
strife. 
In his annua e o ~t , for these roads for 
the fiscal vp,ar embracing the latter part of 1861 and 
the early part of 1862. Mr. Hobbs calldd attention to 
th~ small net earnings. Th ~ superintendent ' s report 
of the earning s for that same yea showed a reduction 
of 26 per cent for transpo ati n of passen[ e sand 
16 per cent for transpo ~tation 0 freight. Mr. Gill 
explained the eductions as due to the political 
trou'ole, destro ing communication wi th the South and 
suspending travel. ( 2 
In his annual report. Septemoer 1 , 1863, 
e1braclng the latter part f 1862 and the early par 
of 186~. Presi p.n Hobbs called attention to the fact 
that there had been an increase of receipts fr m 
tra.nsnorta.tion of passenger and freight and the the 
'ncrease was due in a l~rg e meRsu r e to he transporta-
tion of government troops and stores He also spoke 
of the cost to the road in repairinv damage don n 
th p fall of 1862 during the o~cupancy by the Con~ed­
era es. (~ 1 
he eno r ts of shipment fo r th ~ fiscal 
year 1862 a B compared with that of tht=" fi scal year 
1861 show a decrease in shipments of meat h mp. 
1 urnb er, iron, st el. c ffee, sue:ar, flour, wool, 
cotton, shingles, la hs, cars of san and b "ck. 
agricultural lmplements, coal, and several oth~ 
r icles. n increase is sh wn n the shlpmen of 
wheat, corn, and barle • (14) This hel s t rove 
the statement 11 t here was a d crease in receip s 
fr rn shinment of ordinar freight durinp the la p 
part of 1 6 and arly part of 1862 as a resul f 
un settled conditions and the elimin~ tion of rade with 
the South. On th 0 hpr hand there was an increase 
/ 
in shi m nts of foods needed durlnp the War. 
The re or s of shi ment given for f"sc 
e r 186 (35 c mp d with th enorts of ShlP-
ments for 18 2 show a decrp. se ln 1 oer, iron. steel, 
rope, sugar, flour, wool, lime, cement, c rs of brick 
and sand, agrlcultural implements, coal, and several 
other articles. Th y show an ncrease in shipment of 
wheat, me t. c ffee, corn, salt, and a few additional 
artlcles. This shows hat the increase in receip s was 
due in part to shipment of food and supplies, neces-
sary for carrying on War. There seemed to be a de-
crease in those articl s such ae lumb r, brlck, 
a ricultural implements, and artlclee used in times of 
peace in industrlal development. 
Durin the year 1862, a number of soldlers 
were carried on the two roads Hence conclusions may 
18. 
be drawn that/ in the latter part of 1862 and early 
part of 1863, the Louisville and Frankfort and the 
Lexington and Frankfort, although interfered with by 
Confederates, played their part in the War through 
the shipment of troops, government stores, and th~ng s 
necessary for the c ntinuation of th War. 
After 1862, no well planned milltary 
. campaign took place in Kentucky. However, traces of 
the War were felt during the remaining years of the 
Confllct. 
Great excitement prevalled/ in the early 
part of l863; on the routes of the Louisville and 
Frankfort and the Lexing ton and Frankfort roads be-
cause of antlcipated attacks by the rebel forces 
under John Morgan. On February 21, l cl63. a regiment 
of Morgan's cavalry ) led by Colonel Roy S. Cluke, pur-
sued a Federal force from Richmond to Lexing ton. (36 ) 
Mo rgan's cavalry appeared at several towns not far 
dlstant from the railroads. Morgan. himself, passed 
through Kentucky on hlS raid into Indiana but did not 
touch either of these roads. 
However, durlng 1863, bands of guerillas 
caused trouble on these lines. For example, the east 
bound train on July 1, 1863. was thrown from the 
track just west of Christlanburg. (37) A rail had 
been torn from the track by the rebels. The engineer 
saw the trouble ln time to save the lives of his 
passengers but the train ran off the track. The 
guerillas rifled the mail bags. The passengers were 
searched for firearms and valuables and then ordered 
off the train. Two cars were burned. 
On July the seventh. the Louisville train 
left Frankfort on time but was compelled to remain at 
Emlnence for twenty-four hours. Rebels were on all 
sides and wires cut above and below Eminence. Troops 
were sent up to relieve the train and it contlnued on 
its way to Louisvllle. ( 8) 
Condltlons of the trade of the roads as 
shown by the annual reports for the early part of 
1863 h3ve be~n dis~ussed. Thp annual reports in 1864 
./ I 
which em"braced the latter part of 1863 and fl.rst part 
of 1864. show the earnings increased. The president 
called attention, however, to the fact that the ex-
penses had been increased in a greater ratio. He also 
mentioned the fact that the business of the railroad 
had been affeoted .first .oy the guerilla raids which 
caused a lOBS of about $15,000 or 16.000. He Cited 
the f3.ct that another interruption had been oaused by 
changlng the gaug from four feet eight and one-half 
inches to flve feet. in the fall of ld63. (19) This 
change had been ordered by the Natl.onal Government in 
order that the gauge of the Loulsvllle and Frankfort 
and the Lexingt3n and Frankfort rallroads would be the 
same as that of the Kentucky Central and Louisvllle 
Picture Taken at the Depot at Eminence, Ky., in the Year 1860 . 
• 
20. 
and Nashville. This change caused a cessation of bUB-
iness entirely for twelve days and a partial inter-
ference with freight for nearly three months. 
The s perintendent, in his reports for the 
fisc1l year 1864, shows there was ~eceived for trans-
portation an inc ease over the prevlous year of 38 
4/10 per cent for passengers, 36 3/10 per cent for 
troops, 35 per cent for ordinary freight, and 110 per 
cent for government stores. 
He ex. lained the increase,from ordlnary 
sources,as partially due to increased tariff of 
charges for transportation of passengers and freight, 
but he also spoke of the need of a further increase. 
(40) 
The railroads, durlng 1863, continued to 
carry soldiers and prisoners. Thpy also transported 
refugees from the interior of the state where gueril-
laB had oeen causing trouble. On February 20, 1863, 
there were shipped 6,000 garments from Louisvllle to 
the Contraband Association at Cincinnatti. (41) 
The changing of the gauge to agree with the 
LOUlsville and Nashville proved that the National 
Government considered the Louisville and Frankfort and 
the Lexington and Frankfort important llnks in the 
transport~tion system. 
John Morgan made his fifth and last rald in-
to Kentucky ln the swmner of 1864. Morgan said that 
21. 
his idea in making the raid was to break the railroad 
from Cinclnnatti to Lexi~ton and then attack the 
Louisville and Frankfort and the Louisv111e and 
Nashvllle. (42 ) 
Mo rgan sent Captain Jenkins, June 7, 1864, 
to destroy the railroad between Loui sville and Frank-
fo r t to prevent reenforcements being sent. (43) It 
seemed probable that Frankfort would be attacked. 
Ra i lroad connection w1th Louisville havlng oeen re-
established, puolic papers were sent oy train from 
Frankfort to Louisville on the nlnth. The tra i n was 
attacked by guerillas but the guard succeeded in pro-
tecting it. The road was obstructed with rails every 
two hundred or three hundred yards. Nevertheless. 
the train reached Louisville. (44) 
Lexington was captured June the ninth. The 
surrender of Frankfort was demanded but not obta~ned. 
The smaller Benson bridges were bur ned during June. 
(45) Th e presence of the enemy made it dlfflcult to 
secure labor fo r the railroads and interfered wlth the 
operation of the road. 
The guerlllas were also active durlng 1864. 
On June . the elghth, west of Smithfield , a train was 
thrown from the track. The locomotive was injured 
and three cars burned. Th e track was cleared and the 
trip continued on the ninth of June. It was neces-
sary to carry a guard because the road between 
Eminence an d Frankfort was so endangered. (46) 
22. 
On the tenth, three cars and several cattle 
guards were burned. (47) In December 1864, two 
freight trains were thrown from the track and many 
cars were destroyed. One passenger train was thrown 
from the track. (48) 
In spite of the proximity of the enemy, 
the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and 
Frankfort cont~nued to transport troops. gover~ment 
supplies, and prisoners in 1864. 
The annual reports for the year ending June 
30. 1865. embracing the latter part of 1864 as well as 
the early part of 1865, show the gross receipts of 
the roads had increased over the past year but the 
net proceeds were about the same. (49) The earnings 
from transportation of government stores and troops 
formed 23 per cent of the business. (50) 
Bands of guerillas continued to hover 
around the roads in 1865. For example, Sue Munday 
dashed lon to Midway on Feb ruary 2. 1865 an40urned the 
railroad depot. (51) However, the roads continued 
to operate, servlng in much the same way as they had 
done in 1864. 
The annual reports of shlpments, during 
1864 and 1865. show an improvement over the shlpments 
during the years 1862 and 1863. They showed an In-
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crease in shipment of corn. barley, iron. 8teel. flour, 
horses, coffee, wool, cattle, sheep, coal, and several 
other articles. (~2) PrQb~oly, the removal. to a 
limited extent of trade restrictions was partly 
/ 
responsible for the increase. However, when the ship-
menta of the fiscal year 1865 are compared wlth those 
of the year ending June 30, 1861, a decrease is shown 
in most cases, lncreaaes belne noted. however, in ship-
menta of wheat, iron, steel, flour, potatoes. tobacco, 
cattle, horses, corn, and a few other things. This 
would lndlcate that the Louisville and Frankfort and 
the Lexington and Frankfort. during the WAr, carried 
food supplies needed for soldiersi such articles as 
iron and steel, needed in repairing bridges and other-
wise; and other articles needed for military activitles. 
At the same time. certain other artlclea of trade were 
not handles as extensively as ·oefore the War. Again, 
the roads served the Union cause .'Oy transporting 
soldiers and prlsoners of War. 
During the War, these railroads, doubtless, 
rendered thelr grea est service in transportlng 
soldiers and 6upplJoa within the state from one place 
to another. On the other hand, they eVldently served 
as connecting links between the North and South in 
. 
conjunction wlth the Kentucky Cen~ral and Loui6v~lle 
and NaShville. The Louisville and Frankfo t terminal 
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at Louisville was changed so that the cars of that 
road could use the same depot as the LouiBvllle aftd 
Nashvllle. This change/ together with the altering of 
the gauge to five feet, that used by the Louisville 
and Nashville, made it posslble to transport cars 
from one road to the other. Thus the Louisville and 
Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort played their 
part in the great conflict between' the North and the 
South. 
,Chapter II 
The Kentucky Central Railroad 
Like the LOUlsville and Frankfort and the 
Lexington a.nd Frankfort, the Kentucky Central served 
the Unlon cause during the War as a link in the line 
of communication through Kentucky. Extending as it 
did from Covington to L~xin ton, a dlstance of 99 
miles, lt was so situated as to form the link between 
citles north of the Ohio, and Lexington. Thus it 
oompleted the ohain of railroad connection formed oy 
the Lexlneton and Frankfort, the Louisville and 
Frankfort, and the LOUlsville and Nashville, leadlng 
into the South. ln addltion to the 99 miles of road 
from Covington to Lexington, the Kentucky Central 
controlled 12 miles of railroad from Lexi ngton to 
Nl cholasvllle. 
During the period of neutrality, the trade 
of this road, llke that of the LOUlsv~lle and Frlnk-
fort and the Lexington and Frankfort ,was affected by 
the attitude of Kentucky ' s northern neighbors. All 
efforts made by Ohio and Indiana to stop the shipment 
of provislons into Kentucky for fear of those pro-
visions reaching the seceded states interfered with 
the shipments over the Kentucky Central. 
However, this unfriendly attitude did not 
prevent the operation of the road and, from the 
beginnlng, it rendered asslstance to the Union cause. 
On May 7, 1861, the guns for the Home Guards of 
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Fay tte , Clark, and Mon mery, and B ~rb n c un i ee 
were shipped over the Kentucky Central fr m Cov1ngton 
The shipment was qu ' ~tly planned. Someone was 
stationed in the telegraph ffice at Cov ng ton 0 
prevent any information, about the shipment, 'being 
delivered. he guns were loaded n wagons in 
Cincinnatti. Ci izen volunteers in Cincinnatti were 
trying to prevent contraband articles being sen 'nto 
KentucYy withou special permission. As Lieutenant 
Nelson, in charge of the guns, proceeded to the 
ferry, some of those volunteers tried to stop him. 
Nelson informed them that they had no power to ato 
an officer of the United Sates government . The guns 
were Shipped across the river. Thp. t ain was then 
loaded and left at eleven o'clock that night. The 
next mominp the guns were unloaded at Paris and 
Lex~ngton for distriuution over several c unties. (53 
Later, plans were made to send some,guns 
from Cinclnnatti through Covington, over th~ Kentucky 
Central to Lexington, and from thence to C mp Dick 
Ro 'oinson. When the train, carrying the guns.! reacbed 
Cynthiana, the conductor saw a cro d at the depot. 
Fearing that the guns would be seized, he returned to 
Covington with the train. The guns were sent by 
boat to Louisvllle and carried over the Louisvllle and 
Frankfort and the Lex~ngton and Frankfort to 
Lexington. (54) 
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The military campaigns in KentuckY , in 1861, 
d~d not affect the road directly. Hoever. much 
dlScussion took place in regard to a proposed ex-
tension of the road to aid in military plans for the 
campaign in East Tennessee. President Llncoln wish-
ed a railroad constructed to Cumberland Gap or Knox-
ville. He seemed to prefer a railroad to Cumberland 
Gap from Lexington or Nicholasville or to the 
T~nnessee line from Lebanon. Congress, however, 
decided it was not ad isable to oonstruct such a 
military road. 
During 1861, the Kentuoky Central trans-
ported a number of soldiers from place to place with-
in the State, free of charge. (5)) Thus, during 1861, 
the Kentucky Central proved its loyalty to the Union 
by transportlng troops and arms. 
The Kentucky Central, l~ke the Lex~ngton 
and Frankfort and the Louisville and Frankfort, was 
' ffected uy Morgan's raid in 1862. When Morgan was 
plannlng his attack on Midway, he sent troops to 
burn railroad brldges and preven troops be~ng sent 
from C~ncinn~tti and Louisville to interfere with his 
plans. This cau~ed great alarm. The Kentucky Central 
transported a special train of soldiers from Ohio to 
Lexington. (56) 
Morgan entered Cynthiana, on the Kentucky 
Central. July 17, 1862. He burned the rail oad depot 
and auout 200 muskets. (57) 
During Mo gants raid, 3 bridges were burned. 
Telegraph instruments and 18 oars were destroyed. Ten 
tons of iron rail had to be rerolled. The damage 
amounted to 26,750. (58) At that time) the railroad 
was under governmen t oontrol but the troops, whi.oh had 
been guardi ng the road. h \d been removed. (59) 
During the lnvasion of General Bragg and 
General Kirby Smith. in 1862. General Heth was sent 
along the line of the Kentuoky Central to a positiO 
where he could threaten Coving ton. He reached this 
position September 6. 1862 and oooupied it for 
several days. (60) 
1n spite of the damages d~ne to the railroad 
in 1862, operation oontinued until September. Pro-
visions of war were carried on the road. Speolal 
referenoe was madeoy the press to a ten inoh motor, 
/ / 
oapa"ble of throwing a hundred and twenty-eight pounds, 
which was at the depot of Kentucky Central in 
COVington, awalting shipment into Kentuoky. (61) 
1t was seen. September 13, 1863, after a 
report had ~een given by Mr. Bowles, that it would 
be some tim before the railroad oould be operated. 
1t was 3greed that, in order to reduoe expenses, all 
officers of the road, except the superintendent and 
seoretary, would be dismissed and the salarles of all, 
except that of the seoretary. would be dlsoontinued. 
It was further decided that all employees, except 
those necessary to repair the road, would be dis-
missed. (62) Later the Buperintendent's salary was 
continued and a "train master" was apPointed. (63) 
The road was in operation again in 1863. 
o. 
Great excitement prevailed along the line of the 
Kentucky Central during the early part of that year 
because of anticipated attacks by Morgan. Naturally, 
this made the operation of the road more difficult. 
The question of building a railroad to the 
Tennessee line again caused much concern in 1863. 
Nicholasville, the southern terminal of the Kentucky 
Central/ was involved. The agitation was caused by 
the plans and orders of General Burnside, who desired 
such a m~l~tary road constructed. However, this road 
was never built. 
The Kentucky Central was seriously affect-
ed during Morgan's last raid into Kentucky in 1864. 
On June 8, 1864, Morgan sent Major Chenowith to cut 
the Kentucky Central Railroad from Lexington to 
Covington. Chenowith succeeded in burning Keller's 
bridge, north of Cynthiana, th Townsend bridge, and 
several others. (64) On the ninth, the Confederates 
moved to Lexington. The depot of the Kentucky 
Central. in that city, was ourned. (65) 
On June 10, 1864, Bome Ohio troops under 
Colonel J. P. Asper were sent by General Hobson, from 
COvington/ to proceed oy train to Cynthiana. When the 
train was within aoout one mile of Cynthiana, the 
burned Keller's bridge was discovered. The troops 
were t~ken from the tr~in and found, within a short 
time, that they were surrounded by rebels. General 
Hobson arrived out, after a brave defense the Fed-
/ 
erals were forced to surrender on the eleventh. 
Morgan had burned the bridges on the Kentucky Central 
to prevent troops following by railroad while he 
carried out h1s plana to plunder and burn Cincinnatti. 
( 66) 
Mo gan reached Cynthiana June 11, 1864. On 
the twelfth, General Burbridge drove the Confederates 
from Cvnth1ana. Morgan's forces oeing routed, the 
Confederates left the State and the Kentucky Central • 
. 
( 67) 
During these raids, the damage done to th 
road from Covington to Lexington had suffered a loss 
of about $200,000. (68) 
NotWithstanding these attacks, the Kentucky 
Central continued to prove of service in tr~nsporting 
soldiers, prisoners, and supplies. 
During 1865, the road suffered from 
anticipated attacks of guerillas. Yet it continued 
to operate. 
Thus, the Kentucky Central played its part 
n the Civil War. Although unable to operate t 
.I 
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times, during the greater portion of the period of 
the War , it served as a conneoting link between the 
northern oitles of Ohio and Lexl ngton and transportsd 
soldiers, arms, and provisions. 
, I 
Chapter III 
The Mobile and Ohio Railr ad 
/ 
The Mobile and Ohio, extending as it did 
from Mob1le, Alabama, to Columbus, Kentucky, was 
located, except for a few miles. with1n the Confed-
erate Sta eSt Yet the short dista.nce, acrOBS the 
western corner of Kentucky, made the railroad a llne 
of communication with the North. Columbus was not 
only a railroad termlnal but it was also an important 
center on the Mississippi River. Twenty mlles above 
the city was Cairo. an important pOint because it 
was the terminal of the Illinois Centr'll and was 
located at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi 
rivers. Thus, Columbus, the northern terminal of 
the Mobile and Ohio, by means of the Mississippi 
River and Cairo, was connected with the Ohio Valley 
and cities of the Northwest. 
However, the Moblle nd Ohio did not play 
as important a part, in Kentucky, during the War, as 
did some of the other railroads. In the western part 
of the State, the waterways rather than the railroads 
oecame the oenter of the campaigns. 
COl.umuue Was desired, not so much because 
of lts location as the terminus of the railroad, as 
for its posltion on the Mississippi. A di ect line 
of navigation extended from Cai ro, :9as t 001wribus, 
for miles into the South. Columbus, therefore, 
oooupied a commandlng position on the llne of river 
communication to the Gulf, a line which was considered 
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of paramount importance by both the North and the 
South. In 186" General W. T. Sherman revealed his 
opinion of the Mississippi when he said, "We must 
never aga~n allow the enemy to make lodg ments on ~ts 
banks w~th artlllery. Therefore, Columbus, Memphis, 
Vicksburg, and th mouth of the Yazoo must be held 
with troops. " (69) 
The Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers also 
constituted lines of lnv~sion from Kentucky lnto the 
South. 
Hence, the MOQile and Ohio d ' d not playas 
vital a part as did some of the other railroads. Yet, 
because Columbus occupied such an important posltion 
and was desired by both the Federallsts and the Confe~ 
erates. all methods of attack were reverted to and the 
Mooile and Ohio Railroad became involved in the 
c~mpaigns embracing Columbus. 
Because Columbus and Paducah were so close-
ly involved in the campaign S,' thell" railroad connec-
tions will be considered simultaneously. During the 
War, the railroad connecting Paduc~h with Tennessee, 
~n through Mayfield and Pryors into Tennessee. On 
April 4, 1853. Paduoah voted $200,000 for the 
construction of the branch from Paducah to the Moblle 
and Ohio. (70) The road was not completed. however. 
until the Government, during the War, l)u~lt from 
eignt to ten miles of the road. (71) 
Durlng the period of neutrality, in Ken-
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tucky, trade in the western section was affected as 
was the trade in other parts of the state. The 
citizens of Illinois, like those of Indlana and Ohio, 
looked with suspicion upon thelr southern neighbor 
and tried to stop provlsiQns being sent to Kentucky 
for fear that the articles would reaoh the seceded 
sta tes. In the early part of 1861, the governor of 
Illinois ordered some war materials seized at Cairo. 
Llncoln afterwards, approved the order. (72) 
I 
On September 3, 1861, Confederate troops 
took possession of Columbus while Federal troops, by 
septemoer 5, 1861, oocupied Paducah as well as Cairo. 
( (13) 
When Brigadier-General U. S. Grant entered 
Paducah/ he found eVluence that showed some of the 
citizens were in sympathy with the Confederates. He 
took possession of the railroad depot. (74) 
On September 12,· 1861, at a depot on one of 
these western rallroads, was found about twenty 
thousand dollars worth of stores WhlCh, it was supposed 
/ 
were intended for the Confederates. These stores 
consisted of flour, lard, coffee, soap, and candles. 
By the end of September, 1861, Columbus, 
Fort Henry, and Fort Donelson were on the Confederate 
llne of defense. In February, 1862, Grant cut the 
1'lne of defense by capturlllg Fort Henry on the Tennee-
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see Rivpr and Fort Donelson on the Cumberl~nd River. 
( 76). Columbus was aband n d. 
Thus, in 1861 and in 1862, the rivers were 
involved 1n the campaign to a greater extent than the 
railroads. 
Moreover, the ra1lro ·>.ds seemed to be located 
in a territory where thp loy~lty of the cltizens to 
thp. Union Cause was often questioned. 
On February 20, 1863, General Asboth, 
comm~nder of the post at Columbus , declared that dis-
loyal C1 tlzens on the MOb1le t:\nd Ohio Railroa.d 
encouraged the guerillas to make raids upon that 
road. He, therefore, ordered that~ for every ra1d 
made on the road, c1tizens living the nearest to the 
,I 
scene of the ra1d, should De arrested and held as 
hostages unt~l the delivery of the real offenders. 
( 77) 
On November 19, 1862, John A. RaVll1ns, 
Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Tennes-
see, issued an order saYlng that frelght agents on 
military railroads should report t nost provost-
marshall all cotton or other pr1vate propert shipped 
by them and/ when shiuments were made by persons Who 
did no have permits, notice shOUld be given to pro-
vost-marshal at Columbus, Kentucky, who would seize 
the goods for the Government. (78) 
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ln Novemuer 1363, General Grant gave orders 
to seize the Paducah Railroad, to take up and remove 
the rails t~ some places in Tennessee. The citizens 
urged Governor Bramlette to send a protest to Grant. 
Governor Bramlette sent the protest. (79) 
Grant ' s a.nswer was given November 28, 1863. 
He said that he considered the "Citlzens of Paducah, 
almost to a man", disloyal and that, therefore, they 
deserved no favors from the Government. He accused 
the president of the road of being disloyal. He s~id, 
moreover, that the Government and not the cltizens of 
Paduc~h had comuleted the railroad. However, he sus-
pended the order for ta.king up the track, exc ept the 
part lald by the Gove nment, until the case could be 
referred to higher authorlty. (80) 
In the year 1864, Paduc~h and Columbus were 
affected by raids and consequently the rallToads were 
affected. 
In March, 1864, the Federals occupied 
Paduca.h, Ca iro, Columbus, Hickman, and Union Ci ty. 
(81 ) 
On March 23, 1864, Unjon City was threaten-
ed b Confedera.te cavalry. n the twenty-fourth, 
Brigadler-General Brayman left C~jro, with aid, for 
Union City. He disemoarkad at ColumbUS and took the 
train for Unlon C1 ty. (82) Wl'len wi thin six miles of 
the city. h~ learned of its surrend ~ and turned back. 
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The Confederates Nent from Union City to 
Paducah, havlng been joined by another force. They 
took Paduc~h, March 26, 1864, but the Federals fired 
on them from the ooats and the fort. The city was 
deBt oved to a g eat extent. (83) The Confederates 
retreated along the line of the railroad toward Ma -
field. 
On April 14, 18641 a force again attacked 
Paducah, were driven off , and retreated to~rd May-
f ~eld. (84) 
When Brayman arrived at Calro as oommander, 
Maroh 19. 1864, he found trade regulations were lax 
in the Distriot of Cairo. (85) The small forts were 
pl)'oes fc)r smuggling oontraband articles. (86) The 
railroad from ColumbuB to Union City was operated at 
the expense of the Government. At the same time. it 
\~s used to oar y su~plles whioh often went to dis-
loyal people or were seized by Confederates. The road 
from Paduoah to Mayfield was operated by its owners 
and quantitips of supplles were oarrled by it to the 
Confeder~tes. (87) 
General Brayman issued orders, April 2. 
1864, stopping trade. (88 He said tha all perml s 
for landing goods, supplles, or articles for sale/ be-
tween Paduoah and Memphis, or at those two clties, 
were suepended until further orders. The oommandlng 
officers at Paducah and Columbus were to retain 
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control of all engines and cars and to permlt no 
tralna to run except for military purposes. 
Thus . during the Civil War, the railroads 
~ western Kentucky, did not lsv as importan a part 
as did the railroads in Central and Northern Kentucky. 
They were auxl]arles of lines of waterways from a 
/ 
milltary v1ewpoint. At t i mes, Confederate sympa-
thizers utilized them for shipping articles. On the 
other hand. the Union officials found hem valuable 
in transporting troops and used them when necessity 
arose. 
,CONCLUSION 
Before the dawn of 1861, the railroads of 
Kentucky had been considered agents of industrial and 
commerclal adv~ncement. By the close of the War. in 
1865. they had proven their value from a military 
viewpoint. Tnose organizatirms, intended for 
advancement of industry and commerce, in times o~ 
peace, had been utilized in the great political con-
'flict 'between the North and the South. 
Upon various occasions, they had been suu-
jected to attacks oy invading armies and gueri1l~s. 
At imes, some had been so seriously affected as to 
be forced to cease operations. Nevertheless. they had 
proved valuable in tr~nspo rt lng troops, provis'ons, 
and government sUDulles within the State. S~veral 
ro~ds. by uniting their strength, had served as 
connecting links in a cha i n which made poss ib l ~ the 
transfer ing of men and provlslons from oeyond the 
Ohio into the South. 
The losses incurred, during the War . by 
Kentucky's Ra i lroads , with the exception of the 
Lonl sVllle and Nashville, tended to have a depressing 
effect. No g reat projections, concerning ra i lroad 
extension , were undertaken by any excep t the 
Louisville and Nashville. No d~ub t the . Civil War , 
hsltinr as it di d ra i lroad expansion for several 
years, had a permanent effect upon the ra i l~oadB. 
· 
, . 
being responsible, to a certain extent, fo~ the re-
organizations that hav taken ~lace since 1865. 
y t, the fact that, dur'ng the p riod of 
the W~r, the railroads played their part, must not 
be forgotten. They helped to bring to a cl e th 
p litical strIfe which ) ere lon~gave place to a 
period wherein railro ds co Id se ve th ountry, not 
as mllltary aids . but as links in th chain of 
industrial and commercial deve lopment. 
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